The war and the hostages
Where the Gaza war, the Iran and Lebanon fronts and the Oct 7 inquiry stood in September 2026, what Israelis think about them, and what the parties promise.
- A commission outside the 1968 lawLikudReligious Zionism–ZehutPeople of IsraelShasUTJOtzma Yehudit54.6
- An independent inquiry, form not setRa'am4.8
- A state commission under the 1968 lawYashar!B'YachadThe DemocratsYisrael BeiteinuBlue and WhiteReservists–EconomicJoint List60.6
Answers in order from one end of the debate to the other. Seats are the current polling average; the tick is 61. Each list's own words and sources.
Facts checked October 5, 2026. Every number shows its source and date.
What is at stake
The Gaza war (officially in Israel, "Swords of Iron") began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas-led gunmen attacked southern Israel, killing some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and taking 251 hostages (Times of Israel, Oct 10, 2025); 1,200 is the Israeli Foreign Ministry's count, revised from 1,400 (Nov 10, 2023). A UN team led by Pramila Patten, the UN's special representative on sexual violence in conflict, found "reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred in multiple locations," including rape and gang rape in at least three, though it could not verify reported rapes in some; it found "clear and convincing information" of rape and sexualized torture of hostages (UN News, March 4, 2024).
Three years on, the rescue question is closed. All 251 people abducted that day have come home: 166 alive and 85 dead, of whom 41 were taken alive and killed in captivity (Times of Israel, Oct 3, 2026). The live arguments are whether they could have come home sooner, and who investigates Oct 7. Nitzan Alon, the IDF's former hostage point man, said in October 2026 that Israel "could and should have shortened the war" and brought the captives home "maybe a year earlier," and that Netanyahu "also had his political and personal considerations."
Gaza. A ceasefire under a US-brokered deal took effect on October 10, 2025 (Times of Israel, Oct 10, 2025). The share of Gaza that Israel occupies grew from about 53% at the ceasefire to nearly 70% by August 2026 (Chatham House, Aug 3, 2026), and Israel has carried out "near-daily strikes throughout Gaza since the ceasefire" (Times of Israel, May 5, 2026). The Gaza Health Ministry counts 73,922 Palestinians killed since October 2023, 1,402 of them since the ceasefire was announced. OCHA attributes these figures to the ministry, which "operates under the de facto authorities" (UN OCHA, Sept 23 and Sept 25, 2026).
Saad Abu Aita, 49, lives in a tent in central Gaza and awaits medical evacuation abroad:
On October 14, 2023, a week after the war started, my home was bombed and I was wounded. My father and two of my children were killed in the bombing. My mother, my wife, two of my other children and I survived.
Each side accuses the other of breaking the truce. The IDF said gunmen from a tunnel in Rafah killed two soldiers on October 19, 2025, a Hamas "violation"; Israeli strikes that day killed at least 45 people, Gaza's Hamas-run civil defense said (Times of Israel, Oct 19, 2025).
Iran and Lebanon. Announcing the Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire that took effect on November 27, 2024, President Biden said Hezbollah's cross-border attacks had forced 70,000 Israelis to flee their homes in the north (Times of Israel, Nov 26, 2024). Iran attacked Israel directly in April and October 2024 (Apr 14, Oct 2, 2024); Israel struck Iran on June 13, 2025, and the two exchanged fire until a ceasefire on June 24 (June 24, 2025). The US-Israel war on Iran began on February 28, 2026 (Feb 28, 2026), and on September 1 US forces struck Revolutionary Guard targets in Iran (Sept 1, 2026). Israeli troops were still in southern Lebanon in late September (Times of Israel, Sept 28, 2026).
The cost at home. Since October 7, 2023, 1,318 security personnel have been added to the official fallen roll, the Defense Ministry reported on October 4, 2026; the National Insurance Institute counts 1,029 civilians killed in terrorist attacks, JNS reported. Both totals include October 7. The IDF promised to cap reserve duty at 70 days in 2026; by late September "most reserve units have already exceeded 100 days" (Jerusalem Post, Sept 25, 2026). How the load falls by community is on the draft page.
The inquiry. A state commission of inquiry under the 1968 law has its members appointed by the Supreme Court president and must be headed by a judge (IDI, Dec 24, 2025). Netanyahu opposes one. His coalition's alternative, described as a "national" commission, has no judges choosing its members: 80 Knesset members would appoint it, or else coalition and opposition would name three each. It passed a first reading 59–0 on July 6, 2026, with the opposition boycotting (Times of Israel, July 7, 2026), and was not completed before the end of the Knesset term (Ynet, Oct 4, 2026). On September 23 the Supreme Court left the decision to the next government, which must respond by January 15, 2027 (Times of Israel, Sept 23, 2026).
What Israelis think
No published 2026 survey breaks these questions down by religiosity; the figures below are by political camp, or Jews and Arabs.
During the war the public put the hostages ahead of toppling Hamas, and by spring 2025 so did a narrow majority of the Jewish right.
Which of Israel's two declared war goals is more important today: toppling Hamas, or bringing home all the hostages? (share answering the hostages)
Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Israeli Voice Index, Mar 31–Apr 6, 2025, 598 interviews in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic. Toppling Hamas was put first by 25% of all respondents and 38.5% of Jews on the right. IDI gives the January 2024 share for the hostages as about half of the public.
In September 2025, among Jews who wanted the war ended, 50.5% gave the hostages' danger as the main reason and 2% gave reducing harm to Gaza's residents (IDI, Sept 2025).
Since the ceasefire the mood is doubtful rather than dovish. Only 27% say Israel won in Gaza, and 59% think an attack like Oct 7 could come again from Gaza, up from 52% a year earlier (INSS, Sept 24, 2026).
In August 2026, 20% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza told the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) that Hamas had won, 15% Israel and 60% neither; 72% said Hamas should not disarm before a full Israeli withdrawal, and support for Hamas had fallen to 24% from 35% ten months earlier (18% in the West Bank, 33% in Gaza) (PCPSR, Aug 5–8, 2026). PCPSR's first post-attack poll asked what respondents thought of Hamas's decision to launch the October 7 offensive "given its outcome so far": 72% (82% in the West Bank, 57% in Gaza) said it was correct. PCPSR wrote that this "does not mean support for all acts that might have been committed by Hamas fighters on October 7": 85% had not seen videos of Hamas killing Israeli civilians, and 7% said Hamas had done so (PCPSR, Nov 22–Dec 2, 2023). In October 2025, 53% (59% West Bank, 44% Gaza) called the decision correct (PCPSR, Oct 22–25, 2025).
The war also sits near the center of the vote: 68% of Jewish Israelis and 32% of Palestinian citizens of Israel call Oct 7 a central factor in choosing a party (IDI, Aug 31–Sept 3, 2026).
On the inquiry, the headline number depends on the question. Asked to support or oppose a state commission, 74% backed one in September 2025 (IDI); INSS found 75% support in September 2026, including 52% of coalition voters (INSS, Sept 24, 2026). Offered a commission without judges as well, many on the right choose that instead.
Each survey asked its own question about how Oct 7 should be investigated; the options column gives what respondents were offered.
| Survey | Options offered | State commission | Right or coalition |
|---|---|---|---|
| IDI, Jul–Aug 2024Israel Democracy Institute, Jul 30–Aug 4, 2024 | State commission, government commission, or comptroller/internal probes | 67% | Right-wing Jews: 56% |
| IDI, Sep 2025Israel Democracy Institute, Sep 14–18, 2025 | Support or oppose a state commission | 74% | Not reported |
| IDI, Dec 2025Israel Democracy Institute, as reported by the Times of Israel, Dec 2025 | State commission, politically appointed commission, or comptroller and defense probes | 55% | Right-wing Jews: 36% |
| INSS, Dec 2025Institute for National Security Studies, Dec 11–14, 2025 | State commission or Knesset-appointed committee | 57% | Not reported |
| JPPI, May 2026Jewish People Policy Institute, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, May 2026 | State commission, national commission without judges, government commission, or none | 46% (national commission without judges: 40%) | 80% of the right prefer a body without judges |
| INSS, Sep 2026Institute for National Security Studies, Published Sep 24, 2026 | Question format not published | 75% | Coalition voters: 52% |
Strongest shade: 100%. Source: IDI; INSS; JPPI (each row gives its own source), 2024–2026. Different surveys with different questions, shown side by side to compare question design, not as one series. IDI December 2025 and JPPI May 2026 figures come from press write-ups of the surveys.
The army keeps the trust of both camps; the government does not.
Trust to a large or fairly large extent
All respondentsCoalition votersOpposition voters
- IDF
- Netanyahu
- The government
The numbers: Trust in the army, the prime minister and the government
| All respondents | Coalition voters | Opposition voters | |
|---|---|---|---|
| IDF | 73% | 82% | 79% |
| Netanyahu | 31% | 68% | 6% |
| The government | 25% | 55% | 6% |
Source: Institute for National Security Studies, National Security Survey, Jul 23–26, 2026, 803 interviews in Hebrew and 133 in Arabic. Among Jewish respondents: IDF 83%, Netanyahu 37%, the government 31%. Among Arab respondents: IDF 34%, Netanyahu 6%, the government 5%.
What the parties say
On Gaza, Netanyahu said in August that "Israel rejects the 15-point document" of the Board of Peace and that the army "will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed" (Al Jazeera, Aug 9, 2026). Criticizing the plan, opposition leader Naftali Bennett said Israel "must not budge a centimeter from the red line until Hamas is disarmed and the weapons are removed from Gaza," and Gadi Eisenkot said Israel "must not accept a reality in which Hamas survives, rearms, and waits for the opportunity to carry out the next massacre" (Jerusalem Post, Aug 1, 2026). Itamar Ben-Gvir's "Disengagement 710" plan sets a target of 250,000 Palestinians leaving Gaza in its first year (Jerusalem Post, Sept 3, 2026), and Ofer Winter launched his party saying "There is one solution in Gaza: migration" (Ynet, Aug 25, 2026).
On the inquiry, Ynet asked every party the same question in October 2026; most coalition parties did not answer.
Who should investigate October 7?
A commission outside the 1968 law54.6 seats
Likud22.1 seats
No official response. Likud "later sought to advance a private bill creating an alternative body described as a 'national' commission, but the effort was not completed before the end of the Knesset term" (Ynet's account).
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026. On the record, because the party did not answer the questionnaire
Religious Zionism–Zehut5.7 seats
Religious Zionism: "supports establishing a national, independent, genuine and fair commission of inquiry... We will under no circumstances support a 'state' commission of inquiry..." Zehut, its list partner: "a neutral commission with unlimited powers... The coalition and opposition will appoint its members equally."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
People of Israel4.2 seats
"Immediately upon the establishment of the next government, a commission of inquiry will be formed... a secret vote in the new Knesset to appoint the commission's chair and deputy chair, retired judges who will select the remaining members of the commission."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
Shas7.6 seats
Declined Ynet's survey. On the record: backed the coalition's bill for an Oct 7 panel appointed through the Knesset, not a state commission, which passed its first reading 59 to 0 on Jul 7, 2026, with the opposition boycotting.
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026; Times of Israel, Jul 7, 2026, Jul 7, 2026. On the record, because the party did not answer the questionnaire
UTJ7.6 seats
Declined Ynet's survey. On the record: backed the coalition's bill for an Oct 7 panel appointed through the Knesset, not a state commission, which passed its first reading 59 to 0 on Jul 7, 2026, with the opposition boycotting.
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026; Times of Israel, Jul 7, 2026, Jul 7, 2026. On the record, because the party did not answer the questionnaire
Otzma Yehudit7.4 seats
Declined Ynet's survey. On the record: when the cabinet set up a ministerial panel to shape its own Oct 7 inquiry instead of a state commission, Ben-Gvir, a member of the panel, said "the framework must be national, without people from the legal system; those sitting on the bench are among the investigated" (translated).
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026; Mako (Hebrew), Nov 17, 2025, Nov 17, 2025. On the record, because the party did not answer the questionnaire
An independent inquiry, form not set4.8 seats
A state commission under the 1968 law60.6 seats
Yashar!21.0 seats
"The first decision of our government will be to establish a state commission of inquiry into the Oct. 7 massacre. The commission will be established in accordance with Section 1 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 1968."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
B'Yachad10.6 seats
"We will establish a state commission of inquiry in accordance with the law within the first five minutes of the first government meeting, on the day the government is sworn in."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
The Democrats9.0 seats
"Establishing a state commission of inquiry will be the first decision the party advances in the next government... The commission's members will be appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, as required under the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 1968."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
Yisrael Beiteinu8.2 seats
"We support establishing a state commission of inquiry exactly according to the existing law in the State of Israel. This will be the first decision we make in the government we establish."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
"Blue and White has supported and continues to support establishing an independent and impartial state commission of inquiry into Oct. 7... the current mechanism is a good one."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
Reservists–Economic4.1 seats
"We support a state commission of inquiry. It is preferable to reach broad agreement on its composition. Who should appoint it? The Supreme Court, with a preference for Sohlberg."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
Joint List7.7 seats
"We support establishing a state commission of inquiry under existing law, headed by a Supreme Court justice and appointed by the president of the Supreme Court." Wants its mandate to include "the policies of occupation, blockade and rejection of peace under Netanyahu governments."
Ynet, Oct 4, 2026
No position in these sources
NoamNo position found
Party answers to a Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth survey of all parties (Oct 4, 2026). Likud gave no official response; its row is Ynet's account of its bill for a 'national' commission. Otzma Yehudit, Shas and United Torah Judaism declined to respond; the Shas and UTJ rows add the coalition bill they backed at its first reading (Times of Israel, July 7, 2026), and the Otzma Yehudit row its leader's words in the cabinet in November 2025. No published position found for Noam (checked October 2026).
Misreadings
"The Israeli argument is the American one." An American reader may expect the argument to center on Palestinian civilians. In Israel the mainstream argument was hostages against fighting on, and now it is accountability. In July 2025, 78% of Jews said Israel is "making substantial efforts to avoid causing unnecessary suffering to Palestinians in Gaza"; 22.5% of Arab citizens agreed. In the same survey, asked "To what extent are you personally troubled or not troubled by the reports of famine and suffering among the Palestinian population in Gaza?", 79% of Jews said they were not so troubled or not at all troubled; 86% of Arab citizens said they were troubled (IDI, July 2025). Some Jewish Israelis dissented in the hostages' name. In April 2025 close to 1,000 Air Force veterans signed a letter demanding the hostages' return even if it meant ending the war; over 150 former navy officers wrote that "the resumption of fighting delays the release of the hostages, endangers the soldiers and harms innocent civilians" (Times of Israel, Apr 10, 2025). Views closer to American critics' are held mainly by Palestinian citizens of Israel, 93% of whom wanted the war ended in September 2025 (IDI).
"The war is over." Gaza has a ceasefire, but Israel held nearly 70% of the Strip in August 2026 and struck it near-daily; the Gaza Health Ministry counts 1,402 Palestinians killed since the ceasefire was announced. Troops stayed in southern Lebanon into late September.
"The hostage families were one movement." In June 2025 the Hostages and Missing Families Forum called "the return of all hostages through a comprehensive deal" "the victory of this war" (Times of Israel, June 22, 2025). After Hamas killed six hostages in captivity, organizers estimated 500,000 people rallied on September 1, 2024 (Times of Israel, Sept 1, 2024). The Tikva Forum, another group of hostage families, seeks every captive's release "by means which strengthen the State of Israel," and says "our only option is to win this war" (Tikva Forum).
"The inquiry is a side issue." It is also a fight about judges: whether the Supreme Court president picks the panel. See courts and the judicial overhaul.