Palestinian citizens of Israel
About a fifth of Israel's population: who is counted, how their towns have voted since 2019, what they say on the issues, and why crime leads their agenda.
Share of registered voters who voted.
The numbers: Turnout: Palestinian citizens of Israel and all voters, 2019–2022
Source: IDI (Arik Rudnitzky); Central Elections Committee, 2019–2022. IDI's term is "Arab" turnout, measured in Arab and Druze localities; Druze localities cannot be separated out in this series. The all-voters column is from the CEC results files (data.gov.il)
Facts checked October 5, 2026. Every number shows its source and date.
Palestinian citizens of Israel are the Arab Muslims, among them the Negev Bedouin, and Arab Christians who hold Israeli citizenship. Israeli officials, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and Israeli pollsters such as IDI call them "Arabs," "Arab citizens" or "Arab Israelis." The name itself is contested, and the contest shows up in the surveys: asked in 2019 to pick a label, most picked a Palestinian one; asked to pick the single most important part of who they are, most pick "Arab" or "Israeli citizenship". This page uses "Palestinian citizens of Israel" and gives each source's own term where it quotes one.
Size, growth and geography
How many there are depends on who is counted. CBS put Israel's Arab population at 2,173,000 in September 2026, 21.7% of the population by its count, which leaves foreign nationals out of the base; the total including them was 10,305,000 (CBS via Times of Israel, September 9, 2026). IDI notes that CBS's Arab count includes Arab residents of East Jerusalem, most of whom hold permanent residency rather than citizenship, and it includes Druze. IDI's split is for the end of 2020: 1,957,270 Arabs including East Jerusalem (21.1%), and 1,595,300 citizens without it (17.2%). The difference was "almost 362,000" East Jerusalem residents (IDI, March 2022). East Jerusalem Palestinians are outside this page's group and appear here only in that population note.
Among citizens outside East Jerusalem at the end of 2020, 82.9% were Muslim, 9.2% Druze and 7.9% Christian. Just over half (51.6%) lived in the north and Galilee, 19.7% in the Triangle, 17.5% in the Negev and 8.3% in mixed cities (IDI, 2020 data). CBS counted 1.849 million Muslims in Israel in May 2026 (CBS via TPS, May 26, 2026).
The Negev Bedouin numbered about 325,000 at the end of 2023, about a fifth of the Negev's population. They grew sixfold between 1995 and 2023, and 48.6% are under 17. Between 70,000 and 90,000 live in what the State Comptroller calls "dispersed communities" and are commonly called unrecognized villages (State Comptroller via Jerusalem Post, April 28, 2026). In the unrecognized villages, IDI found "only 10 elementary schools, and not a single secondary school" (IDI, 2021).
The newest income figures found are from 2018: 45.3% of Arab families were below the poverty line, against 13.4% of Jewish families, and Arab men earned 77% of what Jewish men earned (IDI, 2018 data).
How their towns have voted, 2019–2022
Turnout was highest, 64.8%, in March 2020, when four parties ran as one Joint List, and fell to what IDI called "an all-time low" of 44.6% a year later, after Ra'am left (IDI, April 2021).
The table shows how five large towns voted. Each list appears under the name it ran under that year. Rahat in the Negev is Ra'am's base. In the Galilee and the Triangle, the 2022 vote split three ways.
Share of valid votes cast in each town, computed from the Central Elections Committee's locality results files. These are town results, not the vote of a group.
| Town | April 2019 | September 2019 | March 2020 | March 2021 | November 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nazareth | Hadash–Ta'al 53.7, Ra'am–Balad 29.5 | Joint List 91.7 | Joint List 95.7 | Joint List 64.7, Ra'am 23.9 | Hadash–Ta'al 45.3, Balad 26.2, Ra'am 21.4 |
| Umm al-Fahm | Hadash–Ta'al 79.7, Ra'am–Balad 12.3 | Joint List 95.8 | Joint List 98.5 | Joint List 80.5, Ra'am 13.7 | Hadash–Ta'al 40.5, Balad 37.9, Ra'am 18.0 |
| Rahat | Ra'am–Balad 47.4, Hadash–Ta'al 40.6 | Joint List 79.6 | Joint List 92.5 | Ra'am 62.9, Joint List 22.1 | Ra'am 64.2, Balad 14.0, Hadash–Ta'al 12.6 |
| Sakhnin | Ra'am–Balad 59.6, Hadash–Ta'al 35.0 | Joint List 89.6 | Joint List 97.2 | Ra'am 61.8, Joint List 35.4 | Hadash–Ta'al 38.5, Balad 30.3, Ra'am 29.1 |
| Shefa-Amr | Hadash–Ta'al 42.3, Ra'am–Balad 19.2, Yisrael Beiteinu 13.4 | Joint List 73.9, Yisrael Beiteinu 10.6 | Joint List 83.1, Yisrael Beiteinu 8.4 | Joint List 53.9, Ra'am 19.3, Yisrael Beiteinu 11.6 | Hadash–Ta'al 36.6, Balad 22.4, Ra'am 20.2, Yisrael Beiteinu 8.2 |
Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (computed), 2019–2022. Lists as they ran each year. April 2019: two pairs, Hadash–Ta'al and Ra'am–Balad. September 2019 and March 2020: one Joint List of Hadash, Ta'al, Balad and Ra'am. March 2021: Ra'am ran alone; the Joint List was Hadash, Ta'al and Balad. 2022: three separate lists. In 2026 the Joint List name returns for Hadash, Ta'al and Balad, with Ra'am separate. Shefa-Amr has a Druze minority, which the town figures cannot separate
See Nazareth on the vote map: Hadash–Ta'al (45.3%), Nov 2022
In 2022, Balad's 138,617 votes (2.91%) fell below the 3.25% threshold and won no seats, while Ra'am and Hadash–Ta'al won five each (CEC results, computed). In Arab and Druze localities that year, Ra'am took 35.2%, Hadash–Ta'al 28.8%, Balad 21.7% and the parties IDI classes as Zionist 14.3% (IDI, December 2022).
For 2026 two lists are running: Ra'am under Mansour Abbas, and a re-formed Joint List of Hadash, Ta'al and Balad. The Central Elections Committee disqualified both in September. On October 2 the Supreme Court unanimously reinstated them, and Balad's leader Sami Abu Shehadeh withdrew his candidacy after the court told him a majority of the nine justices favored disqualifying him (Al Jazeera, October 2, 2026). In three TV polls after the lists were filed, the Joint List polled at 7–8 seats and Ra'am at 4–6 (Times of Israel, September 10, 2026). In May, KAP projected Arab turnout of 53% if the parties ran as three separate lists, as in 2022 (KAP, May 2026). Pollster Yousef Makladeh estimated that a Hadash–Ta'al–Balad slate could lift it "from about 53% to 59%" (Ynet, August 2, 2026).
What they think on the issues
The best cross-tabulation is IDI's Democracy Index 2025: 364 Arab respondents interviewed by phone in Arabic in May 2025, including Druze (IDI, 2025). The newest Arab-sector survey used here is KAP's, from April 26 to May 3, 2026. Its sample of 500 also includes Druze. Neither survey was taken after the October 2 ruling.
What decides the vote. Asked which issue would most affect their choice of party, 49.1% of Arab respondents named the cost of living, against 16.8% of Jews (IDI, May 2025). Crime is the top item on the community's agenda: 71.3% named it the most important issue in May 2026 (KAP). The Abraham Initiatives' count of those killed more than doubled from 2022 to 2023 and has stayed near that level (Abraham Initiatives, December 2025).
People killed in crime and violence; the report's term is "Arab citizens."
Source: Abraham Initiatives, 2025 Crime and Violence Report, report closed December 28, 2025. The 2025 bar is the report's figure to December 28; the Abraham Initiatives homepage (abrahaminitiatives.org) gives 255 for the full year. The same report's age table gives 124 for 2021 and 251 for 2025
The Haredi draft. Only 1.7% named Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription as their deciding issue, against 16.6% of Jews (IDI, May 2025). Palestinian citizens are not drafted: it has been "the declared policy of the Israeli army" not to draft Arabs, IDI's Mordechai Kremnitzer and Talya Steiner wrote (IDI, June 2013). The question asked of them is civic service. In May 2026, 75.8% supported voluntary non-security civic service for Arab high-school graduates (KAP).
Courts. The Supreme Court is the institution Arab respondents trust most (40%), yet 55.5% also say it "intervenes too much in decisions made by the government." The judicial overhaul was the deciding issue for 11.2% (IDI, May 2025).
War and hostages. In late 2023, 56% agreed with Mansour Abbas's statement that the October 7 attack did "not reflect Arab society, the Palestinian people, and the Islamic nation," and 33% disagreed (IDI, December 2023). Trust in the IDF in 2025 was 28% among Muslims and 34% among Christians (IDI). In November 2025, 74.6% said the war had damaged Arab-Jewish relations (KAP).
West Bank. Asked for the most realistic solution, 46.4% chose two states on the 1967 lines, 21.4% said there is no solution and 18.7% chose one state (May 2026). In May 2023 only 17.2% chose two states, and 55.6% said there was no solution (KAP). The question asks what is realistic, not what is preferred. See also a Palestinian state and the 2026 vote.
Religion and state. 80% of Arab respondents say the Jewish component of Israel's identity is too dominant, against 44% of Jews (IDI, May 2025). The 2018 Nation-State Law, passed 62–55 (Reuters/AP via ABC News, July 19, 2018), declares: "The realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People." It gives Arabic "a special status," where Arabic had been an official language before (Knesset English text).
Economy. Beyond the cost of living, 73.4% called their own economic situation fairly good in November 2025, the highest share KAP had recorded in the past year (KAP).
Joining a government. 77.2% support an Arab party joining the next coalition: 43.3% any coalition, 33.9% only a center-left one (KAP, May 2026). In IDI's survey, 86% of Arab respondents back Arab parties in government, against 27% of Jews (IDI, May 2025). Both figures include Druze.
Who they are
Identity answers depend on the question. Asked for the single most important component of their identity, few choose "Palestinian":
What is the most important component of your personal identity? (one choice)
May 2023Dec 2024Nov 2025May 2026
- Arab
- Israeli citizenship
- Religion
- Palestinian
The numbers: Palestinian citizens of Israel: the most important component of personal identity
| Answer | May 2023 | Dec 2024 | Nov 2025 | May 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab | 37.5% | 26.9% | 35.9% | 33.3% |
| Israeli citizenship | 21% | 33.9% | 31.7% | 27.7% |
| Religion | 15.6% | 29.2% | 17.3% | 24.5% |
| Palestinian | 16.5% | 9% | 14.7% | 13.5% |
Source: Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, May 2023 – May 2026, about 500 per wave, by phone in Arabic; ±4.4 points. The source's term is "Arab citizens"; the sample includes Druze, who put Israeli citizenship first (64.8% in May 2026), and no total without them is published. May 2023 and May 2026: KAP May 2026 report. Dec 2024: Times of Israel on the KAP survey (timesofisrael.com). Nov 2025: KAP Nov 2025 report (dayan.org). A Nov 2023 wave is left out because its report was not found
Offered labels instead, most chose a Palestinian one in 2019. That is the newest survey found that asks the question this way:
How respondents defined themselves, among these labels; the source reports the labels and shares but does not print the question wording.
Source: Sammy Smooha, Index of Arab-Jewish Relations, in Fathom, 2019. A different question from the identity-component series above, and older than two years; it is the newest survey found that offers these labels. The source's term is "Arab citizens"
A CBS social survey, reported in May 2025 without its year or wording, found 3% naming "Palestinian" as their primary identity (JNS). The three results ask different questions. They do not contradict each other. Asked whether a citizen who feels part of the Palestinian people can be loyal to Israel, 70% of Arab respondents said yes, against 16% of Jews (IDI, May 2025).
In 2025, 54% of Arab respondents said they feel part of the state and its problems (Muslims 52.5%, Christians 56.5%), down from 66% in 2024. IDI calls the 2024 figure "unusually high" and says 2025 was still one of the highest since its tracking began in 2003. Seventy percent say it is better not to voice political opinions in front of strangers, against about half of Jews. Among Arabs, IDI says, the larger jump came about a decade ago (IDI, 2025). Half of Arab respondents under 55 agree that "it makes no difference who you vote for," against 37% of those 55 and over (IDI, 2025). Among 18–34-year-olds, belief in Arab-Jewish political partnership rose from 51.6% to 59.3% between November 2025 and May 2026 (KAP).
Qassem Awad of Mazra'a, a former council head, lost his son Abdallah to a shooting in February 2025:
The police are failing… Ten months after a murder in full daylight — no arrests, no suspects, no communication with us… And in security cases? They catch suspects within hours. So why not here?
In August Mansour Abbas said: "The option of a joint list of four parties is off the table" (Ynet, August 2, 2026). After withdrawing, Abu Shehadeh said:
In the end, what happened yesterday was a historical catastrophe for democracy, or the very narrow margins of democracy in the State of Israel.