Masorti Israel
Who Israel's traditional (masorti) Jews are, how they overlap with Mizrahi Israel, how the development towns have voted since 2019, and where they stand on the issues.
Share of valid votes cast inside Sderot, Netivot, Ofakim, Beit She'an, Kiryat Shmona and Dimona together, computed from the Central Elections Committee's per-locality result files for the 21st–25th Knessets.
- Likud
- Shas
- List carrying Otzma Yehudit
- United Torah Judaism
- Largest centrist list
- Likud, whole country
The numbers: Six development towns combined, 2019–2022: how these towns voted
| List | Apr 2019 | Sep 2019 | Mar 2020 | Mar 2021 | Nov 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Likud | 44.8% | 44.0% | 50.7% | 43.1% | 40.2% |
| Shas | 15.7% | 20.1% | 20.4% | 20.3% | 22.2% |
| List carrying Otzma Yehudit | Union of Right-Wing Parties 4.9% | Otzma Yehudit 3.5% | Otzma Yehudit 0.7% | Religious Zionism 7.3% | Religious Zionism 17.0% |
| United Torah Judaism | 5.5% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 4.8% | 4.9% |
| Largest centrist list | Blue and White 7.9% | Blue and White 8.4% | Blue and White 8.2% | Yesh Atid 3.8% | Yesh Atid 4.5% |
| Likud, whole country | 26.5% | 25.1% | 29.5% | 24.2% | 23.4% |
Source: Central Elections Committee, locality results (computed), April 2019 – November 2022. Files for each election at media21–media25.bechirot.gov.il/files/expc.csv. Lists are named as they ran that year. Otzma Yehudit ran inside the Union of Right-Wing Parties (with Jewish Home and National Union) in April 2019, alone in September 2019 and March 2020, and inside the Religious Zionism joint list (with Noam) in 2021 and 2022, so that row is a different list each time. National Unity, a separate list in 2022, took a further 4.0% in the six towns. Soldiers' and other double-envelope votes are not assigned to any locality
Facts checked October 5, 2026. Every number shows its source and date.
Size, growth and geography
Traditional Jews, masortim in Hebrew, sit between secular and religious on the scale Israeli surveys use to ask Jews how they see themselves. The Central Bureau of Statistics splits them in two: "traditional, not so religious" and "traditional-religious." Together they are the second-largest Jewish group after the secular: 35.8% of Jews aged 20 and over in the Central Bureau of Statistics' newest count (21.8% plus 14.0%) (CBS via VIN News, September 2026; Ynet).
No fertility or growth figure for traditional Jews as a group was found. Nor could a CBS table of religiosity by town, or the CBS socio-economic ranking of each town, be obtained, so this page describes geography through places whose population history is known.
The best known are the development towns: "around 30 development towns created in the 1950s and 1960s mainly in the north and south of Israel, primarily to house immigrants from North Africa" (Times of Israel, April 2019). This page follows six of them: Sderot, Netivot and Ofakim near Gaza; Dimona in the Negev; Beit She'an and Kiryat Shmona in the north. The wider periphery, the development towns plus Ashdod, Ashkelon and Beersheba, held just under a quarter of Israel's Jews in 2019 (same source).
Masorti and Mizrahi
"Masorti" and "Mizrahi" (Jews whose families came from the Middle East and North Africa) are often used as if they meant the same thing. They overlap but are not the same. Most Mizrahim are not masorti: in Pew's survey, "a plurality of Sephardim/Mizrahim (42%) identify as Masortim," about three in ten as secular, and most of the rest as religious or Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) (Pew, fieldwork 2014–15). And some traditional Jews are Ashkenazi or from the former Soviet Union.
Mizrahi is now mostly a matter of self-description. In 2025, 35.2% of Jewish adults called themselves Mizrahi, 39.8% Ashkenazi and 15.3% mixed (IDI, May 2025). Self-described Mizrahim placed themselves 73% on the right, 20% in the center and 5% on the left; Ashkenazim 49%, 31% and 18.5% (same source). Yet the old ethnic divide rarely registers as such: asked which tension in Israeli society is sharpest, about 2% of Jews chose Mizrahim versus Ashkenazim and 55% chose right versus left (same source).
How their towns have voted, 2019–2022
These tables show places, not people. They are computed from the Central Elections Committee's locality result files (CEC), and each list appears under the name it ran under that year.
Three things stand out. Likud ran above its national share in every one of these towns in every election, but its peak was March 2020 (50.7% across the six) and it fell back to 40.2% in 2022. The 2022 change was a shift within the right, not away from it: the Religious Zionism joint list, carrying Itamar Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit, rose from under 1% for Otzma alone in 2020 to 17.0% in the six towns and 24.6% in Sderot, against 10.8% nationally. And the four lists that went on to form the 2022 government (Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism and Religious Zionism) took 84% of the six towns' vote, against 48% nationally (CEC, computed).
Share of valid votes cast in each locality, computed from the Central Elections Committee's per-locality result files for the 23rd (March 2020) and 25th (November 2022) Knessets.
| Place | Likud 2020 | Likud 2022 | Shas 2022 | Religious Zionism 2022 | UTJ 2022 | Yesh Atid 2022 | National Unity 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sderot | 51.1% | 41.5% | 12.1% | 24.6% | 1.0% | 5.8% | 5.6% |
| Netivot | 36.5% | 27.5% | 42.5% | 15.7% | 6.0% | 1.9% | 1.7% |
| Ofakim | 40.4% | 32.1% | 23.1% | 15.9% | 15.0% | 4.3% | 3.3% |
| Beit She'an | 62.7% | 47.9% | 25.0% | 16.1% | 0.8% | 3.1% | 3.2% |
| Kiryat Shmona | 58.1% | 49.5% | 11.0% | 13.7% | 0.6% | 6.6% | 7.3% |
| Dimona | 61.8% | 50.9% | 11.7% | 15.8% | 2.8% | 6.1% | 4.5% |
| Tel Aviv-Yafo, for comparison | 21.8% | 17.0% | 4.3% | 4.5% | 0.8% | 32.8% | 11.0% |
| Whole country | 29.5% | 23.4% | 8.2% | 10.8% | 5.9% | 17.8% | 9.1% |
Strongest shade: 100%. Source: Central Elections Committee, locality results (computed), March 2020 and November 2022. 2020 file at media23.bechirot.gov.il/files/expc.csv. Religious Zionism 2022 was the joint list of Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit and Noam. Netivot and Ofakim have large Haredi populations, so their Shas and UTJ shares are not a traditional vote
Shas, a Haredi-led party with a traditional base, is covered as a party on the Haredim page. Here it matters for its traditional voters: its share in the six towns rose from 15.7% to 22.2% between April 2019 and 2022. Netivot, where it took 42.5%, and Ofakim have large Haredi populations, so those results are not a traditional vote.
Surveys of people show the same rise for Religious Zionism. Pooled IDI surveys from November 2022 to October 2023 found that traditional voters chose Likud 46.5%, Religious Zionism 14%, Yesh Atid 13% and National Unity 12.5%; Likud was up from 39% in 2021 and Religious Zionism from 4% (IDI, Finkelstein, June 2026). 57% of Likud's 2022 voters were traditional. The town and survey figures move differently (Likud fell in the six towns but rose among traditional voters nationally), and one should not be read as the other.
No published 2026 poll breaking vote intention down by religiosity was found. What exists is reporting: Shas was "polling at just seven seats in several recent pre-election surveys," against 11 won in 2022, and Gadi Eisenkot of Yashar! said he meets Shas supporters who want to vote for him "in Kiryat Shmona, Shlomi, Or Yehuda and elsewhere" (Times of Israel, August 21, 2026).
What they think on the issues
The two traditional groups usually sit between secular and national-religious Jews, with the traditional religious closer to the religious right. 76.8% of traditional religious and 64.2% of traditional non-religious Jews place themselves on the right (IDI, May 2025).
The Haredi draft. In March 2026, 54% of traditional non-religious and 37% of traditional religious Jews called the government's decision to suspend what IDI's question named the "Military Service Exemption Law" "a political deal" (IDI, March 2026). See the Haredi draft.
Asked about the government's decision "to suspend the Military Service Exemption Law and to transfer billions of shekels to Haredi institutions," share choosing "A political deal that prioritizes sectoral interests over the good of the public."
Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Israeli Voice Index, March 22–26, 2026, 604 Hebrew-language interviews. The other main answer, "a responsible decision": Haredi 51%, national religious 34%, traditional religious 43%, traditional non-religious 25%, secular 8%
Courts. 21% of traditional religious and 40% of traditional non-religious Jews trust the Supreme Court, against 66% of secular Jews (IDI, May 2025). See courts and the judicial overhaul.
Share of Jewish respondents expressing trust in the Supreme Court.
Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Israeli Democracy Index 2025 (Table 2.6), May 4–28, 2025, 1,205 respondents in the Jewish sample (Jews and others)
War and hostages. Between 2022 and 2025 the groups changed places on security. 51% of traditional religious Jews said Israel ensures its citizens' security in 2025, up from 30% in 2022; among secular Jews the figure fell from 52% to 30% (same source). In March 2026, 85% of traditional religious and 84% of traditional non-religious Jews supported continuing Operation Roaring Lion, against 67.5% of secular Jews (IDI, March 2026). No survey splitting hostage-deal questions by religiosity was found. See the war and the hostages.
Share of Jewish respondents who agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens.
20222025
- Haredi
- National religious
- Traditional, religious
- Traditional, non-religious
- Secular
The numbers: Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, by religiosity, 2022 and 2025
| Group | 2022 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Haredi | 23% | 68% |
| National religious | 32% | 65% |
| Traditional, religious | 30% | 51% |
| Traditional, non-religious | 37% | 52% |
| Secular | 52% | 30% |
Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Israeli Democracy Index 2025 (Table 2.29), May 4–28, 2025 (with the 2022 Index for comparison), 1,205 respondents in the Jewish sample (Jews and others) in 2025
West Bank. 43% of traditional non-religious and 36% of traditional religious Jews said security forces treat violent settlers "too leniently," against 66.5% of secular and 20.5% of national-religious Jews (IDI, December 2025). No 2025–26 annexation question split by religiosity was found. See the West Bank.
Religion and state. The traditional religious are split almost evenly: 28% say the Jewish component of the state is too dominant, 29% the democratic one, and 25% call the balance good. The traditional non-religious lean toward the view that the Jewish component is too dominant (40%, 17% and 28%) (IDI, May 2025). See religion and state.
Economy. 28% of traditional religious and 26.5% of traditional non-religious Jews agreed in 2025 that Israel ensures its citizens' welfare, up from 19% and 20% in 2022, while secular agreement fell from 22% to 8% (same source). See the economy.
Who they are
The Times of Israel's obituary of David Levy describes him as a politician who "mainstreamed Mizrahi involvement in politics." "Born in Rabat, Morocco, Levy immigrated with his family to Israel in 1957," settled in Beit She'an, "a northern development town," was blacklisted from work there after a strike, and became a construction worker in Tel Aviv before entering politics (Times of Israel, June 2, 2024). At his death, Yair Lapid said Levy "brought to the Knesset the voice and representation of the development towns that were so lacking in it" (Times of Israel, June 3, 2024).
Most of his political life he was subjected to racist ridicule.
A veteran Shas activist, not named, described the party's voters in the south to the Times of Israel:
Drive out to the moshavim in the south. You'll see Sephardim wearing black kippahs or large knitted kippahs.
In 2026 the contest for these voters is open. Eisenkot said of Shas that his mother "voted for them for 30 years," and added:
I know Shas voters, I meet them, I grew up with some of them.
A Yashar! member put the pitch in terms of Jewish identity:
Gadi defines himself as traditional, as do I, and this also gives a lot of space for people for whom Judaism or Jewish identity is important.
No interview with an ordinary resident of these towns about the 2026 vote was found.